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INTRODUCTION

Alan Harris was referring to Minnesota’s landmark decision in
State v. Scales that mandated electronic recording of custodial
2
interrogations. At the time, Minnesota was only the second state to
3
adopt a recording requirement. Since Scales, the practice has
4
gained wide support in Minnesota and throughout the country.
Substantial law has developed around recording in the form of
5
statutes, court rules, and special jury instructions. Yet questions
remain as to the extent of the requirement’s application in
Minnesota.
Recently, in State v. Sanders, the Minnesota Supreme Court
faced the question of whether the recording requirement applies
6
to custodial interrogations conducted in another jurisdiction.
Sanders was interrogated by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
agents in Illinois, but, in accordance with FBI policy and Illinois
7
law, the interrogation was not recorded. Evidence from this
interrogation was ultimately admitted in trial, and Sanders was
8
convicted of criminal sexual conduct. On appeal, Sanders argued
in part that the unrecorded interrogation substantially violated
9
Scales and should be suppressed. However, the supreme court
disposed of the case without resolving whether Scales applies to
10
interrogations conducted outside Minnesota.
This note first examines the history of mandatory recording of
custodial interrogations and its expansion throughout the
11
country.
It then details the facts and procedural history of
12
Sanders, concentrating on the supreme court’s holding, followed

County Attorney’s Office (Feb. 8, 2005)).
2. Id. (citing State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994)).
3. See Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 591.
4. In its recommendation that law enforcement agencies videotape
interrogations, the American Bar Association (ABA) pointed out that “[a]n everincreasing number of jurisdictions record interrogations.” ABA RESOLUTION 5
(Feb. 9, 2004), available at http://www.nacdl.org/sl_docs.nsf/freeform
/MERI_attachments/$FILE/MERI_ABA0409.pdf.
5. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 47.
6. 775 N.W.2d 883, 866 (Minn. 2009).
7. Id. at 885.
8. Id. at 886.
9. Id. at 887.
10. Id. at 889.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
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13

by an analysis of the decision.
Finally, the note concludes by
asserting that the Minnesota Supreme Court should have adopted
an exception to Scales for out-of-state interrogations conducted
14
without the involvement of Minnesota law enforcement agencies.
II. HISTORY
A. Early Beginnings
Law enforcement agencies and legal scholars recognized
mandatory recording of interrogations as an advancement in
criminal justice long before the days of tape recorders. In fact, Yale
Professor Edwin Borchard first advocated for mandatory recording
15
using phonographic records in 1932. The National Commission
on Law Observance and Enforcement (Wickersham Commission)
was one of the earliest groups to support recording interrogations
16
as a means to “remedy” the “evil” of third-degree police tactics.
These early advocates viewed recording as a method to prevent
false confessions, increase the effective administration of criminal
justice, and improve relationships between law enforcement and
17
the public.
The landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona was the first case
18
to draw attention to these issues in 1966. Miranda held that the
failure to warn a suspect of his right to counsel and his right to
remain silent prior to a custodial interrogation renders the
19
suspect’s statements inadmissible. While Miranda assured courts
13.
14.
15.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE xvii (Yale Univ. Press 1970) (1932); see also Gail Johnson, False Confessions
and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719, 749 (1997) (noting Borchard’s assertion that police should
record all questioning of suspects).
16. U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, Lawlessness in
Law Enforcement, in 11 U.S. WICKERSHAM COMM’N REPORTS 1, 5 (1931) [hereinafter
WICKERSHAM REPORT].
17. See Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The
Need for Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability
and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 619, 621 (2004) (summarizing the
history and policy behind recording interrogations).
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Today, most jurisdictions require recording Miranda
warnings and have extended the recording throughout the entire interrogation.
See Lisa C. Oliver, Mandatory Recording of Custodial Interrogations Nationwide:
Recommending a New Model, 39 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 263, 267 (2005).
19. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468–77.
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that the defendant understood his rights, uncertainty remained as
20
“Defendants and
to what actually occurred in interrogations.
police often differ at trial over whether police followed Miranda,
whether the defendant waived his or her right to remain silent, and
whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily confessed to the
21
crime charged.” In these situations, the fact-finder must resort to
“testimony that provides biased guidance: either it comes from
officers who want the statement admitted, or it comes from the
22
defendant who wants it suppressed.”
It did not take long before organizations formally recognized
the inherent dilemma of relying on testimony regarding the
circumstances of the interrogation. The American Law Institute
(ALI) regarded mandatory recording as the obvious solution to this
problem, and enacted a Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure (Model Code) in 1975 that required police officers to
23
record all interrogations.
The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws also provided guidelines
24
that similarly required recording.
B. States Take the Lead While the Feds Lag Behind
The movement for mandatory recording was slow to gain
momentum among individual jurisdictions. It was not until 1985
that Alaska became the first jurisdiction to adopt a recording
25
requirement. In Stephan v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court held
20. Daniel D. Donovan & John Rhodes, The Case for Recording Interrogations, 61
MONT. L. REV. 223, 226 (2000). Although the Supreme Court itself has noted that
the secrecy of interrogations “results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact
goes on in the interrogation rooms,” the Court has never addressed whether
recording interrogations should be mandatory. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448; Oliver,
supra note 18, at 268.
21. State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 884 n.1 (2009).
22. Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 20, at 226.
23. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 130.4(3) (1975). The
Model Code contributed significantly to Minnesota’s recording requirement. See
infra note 41 and accompanying text.
24. UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 10 (Second Tentative Draft 1973) (setting forth the
proper procedure for questioning an individual).
25. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1994). The Stephan
decision was composed of two separate cases that were consolidated due to similar
factual issues and a common legal issue. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159
(Alaska 1985). In both cases, the defendants were arrested, interrogated, and
subsequently confessed. Id. at 1158. Also in both cases, there was a working audio
or video recorder in the interrogation room that the police used to record some,
but not all of the interrogations. Id.
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that the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution required
26
recording a defendant’s custodial interrogation. The majority was
“convinced that recording, in such circumstances, [was] a
reasonable and necessary safeguard, essential to the adequate
protection of the accused’s right to counsel, his right against self
27
incrimination and, ultimately, his right to a fair trial.”
After
28
previously recommending this practice, the court intended to
deter future noncompliance by creating an exclusionary rule that
29
precludes admission of unrecorded interrogations at trial.
30
Minnesota was the first state to follow Alaska’s lead. In State v.
Scales, police interrogated the defendant, a murder suspect, for
31
three hours before a formal statement was recorded. Similar to
the Alaska court, the Minnesota Supreme Court had previously
32
urged law enforcement officers to record interrogations. In Scales,
“disturbed by the fact that law enforcement officials ignored [the
court’s] warnings,” the court held that, where feasible, all custodial
interrogations must be electronically recorded if they occur at a
33
place of detention.
The court was largely persuaded by the

26. Stephen, 711 P.2d at 1159. Similar to early legal commentators, the Alaska
Supreme Court recognized that recording not only protects a defendant’s rights,
but also “protects the public’s interest in honest and effective law enforcement . . .
.” Id. at 1161.
27. Id. at 1159–60.
28. See Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 743 n.5 (Alaska 1980) (informing
police that “it is incumbent upon them” to record custodial interrogations); see also
S.B. v. State, 614 P.2d 786, 790 n.9 (Alaska 1980) (“In future cases, it will be a great
aid to the trial court’s determinations and our own review of the record if an
electronic record of the police interview with a defendant is available . . . .” (citing
Mallott, 608 P.2d at 743 n.5)); McMahan v. State, 617 P.2d 494, 499 n.11 (Alaska
1980) (“Again we advise law enforcement agencies that, as part of their duty to
preserve evidence, it is incumbent upon them to tape record, where feasible, any
questioning and particularly that which occurs in a place of detention.” (citing
Mallott, 608 P.2d at 743 n.5)).
29. Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1164.
30. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 591–92 (Minn. 1994).
31. Id. at 590.
32. See State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991) (warning that the
court would “look with great disfavor upon any further refusal to heed these
admonitions”); State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 224 n.5 (Minn. 1988) (urging
recording conversations between police and suspects to avoid factual disputes and
preserve the integrity of the interrogation). These cases, as well as Scales, stem
from the protection of defendants’ constitutional rights against compelled selfincrimination and the procedures required by the Supreme Court in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
33. Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592. However, the court nonetheless affirmed
Scales’s conviction because the remaining evidence was strong and the result
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34

reasoning employed in Stephan, but unlike Alaska, the Minnesota
Supreme Court declined to address whether recording is a due
35
process requirement under the Minnesota Constitution. Instead,
it decided that recording falls within the court’s supervisory powers
36
to “insure the fair administration of justice.”
37
Following the instruction in Scales, Minnesota courts have
38
fostered the new recording requirement on a case-by-case basis.
In their analyses, courts have consistently applied a two-part test to
39
determine whether to admit unrecorded statements. First, courts
40
must determine whether Scales applies to the facts of the case.
Second, if Scales applies, courts must proceed to examine whether
the violation is “substantial” based on factors enumerated in the
41
Model Code.
Since Scales, courts have addressed a myriad of
issues pertaining to the recording requirement, adapted the
requirement where necessary, and created exceptions to the rule
42
through case law.
would have been the same. Id. at 593.
34. Id. at 592 (citing Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1150–60).
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894
(1967).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 42.
39. See, e.g., State v. Inman, 692 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2005) (outlining the
two steps in analyzing an alleged Scales violation); State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661,
674 (Minn. 1998) (finding that Scales applied because the defendant was in
custody, but that the violation was not substantial pursuant to the second step of
the test); State v. Schroeder, 560 N.W.2d 739, 740 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (denying
suppression of the defendant’s statements because the alleged Scales violation was
not substantial pursuant to the second step of the test); see also 7 HENRY W.
MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL LAW &
PROCEDURE § 6.14 (3d ed. 2009).
40. See, e.g., Inman, 692 N.W.2d at 80.
41. See, e.g., id. Inman provides a useful summary of the pertinent factors:
These circumstances include the extent to which the violation was willful,
the extent to which the exclusion will tend to prevent future violations,
the extent to which the violation is likely to have influenced the
defendant’s decision to make the statement, and the extent to which the
violation prejudiced the defendant’s ability to support his motion to
suppress or to defend himself at trial.
Id. at 80 n.3 (citing Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592; MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE § 150.3(3)(b), (d), (f), (g) (1975)).
42. See, e.g., State v. Conger, 652 N.W.2d 704, 709 (Minn. 2002) (holding that
the recording requirement does not extend to non-custodial interrogations); State
v. Coleman, 560 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that unrecorded
custodial statements may be used to impeach defendant’s inconsistent trial
testimony); State v. Gilmartin, 535 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
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As the courts continued to develop the Scales recording
requirement, the practice of mandatory recording slowly expanded
43
beyond Minnesota’s borders.
Even though technology has
44
advanced, the same policy promoted by early legal scholars has
45
continued to serve as the foundation for mandatory recording.
Contemporary legal scholars have echoed their predecessors and
found that recording facilitates truth-finding, fairness,
46
accountability, and, consequently, the law’s integrity. State courts,
legislators, and law enforcement agencies across the country have
47
agreed and adopted their own recording requirements. Further,
many prestigious organizations have endorsed recording custodial
48
interrogations, including the American Bar Association.
Despite the overwhelming support for reform on the state
level, neither the United States Supreme Court nor Congress has
49
addressed the issue.
Surprisingly, federal law enforcement

(holding that the reading of the implied consent advisory is not subject to Scales).
43. In 2003, Illinois became the first state to adopt legislation requiring that
all custodial interrogations in homicide cases be electronically recorded. See 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1 (2003) (amended 2005).
44. Not surprisingly, in some cases technological advancements have promoted
mandatory recording because jurors find it increasingly difficult to accept police
officers’ assertions that they did not tape interrogations because it was not their
policy to do so. Angela Rozas & Joshua Howes, 2 Juries Dubious Over Confession
Tapes’ Merits; They Wanted Interrogations Included, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 2003, at C1.
45. See Drizin & Reich, supra note 17, at 622.
46. See Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 20, at 227.
47. Most jurisdictions have codified recording requirements. See D.C. CODE §
5-116.01 (Supp. 2007); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 25, § 2803-B(1)(K) (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-402 (LexisNexis
2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4503 (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-16 (Supp. 2009);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-211 (2009); WIS. STAT. § 968.073 (2007). However, a New
Jersey court rule and court rulings in Iowa and Massachusetts require recording
interrogations. N.J. CT. R. 3:17; State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 455–56 (Iowa
2006); Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533–34 (Mass. 2004).
At the same time, over six hundred police departments voluntarily record
custodial interrogations. Thomas P. Sullivan, Recording Federal Custodial Interviews,
45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1297, 1313 (2008) [hereinafter Recording Federal Interviews]
(discussing federal agencies’ opposition to recording despite the progression of
recording requirements throughout the country).
48. ABA RESOLUTION, supra note 4 (urging legislatures or courts to enact laws
or rules requiring the practice of recording); see also THE JUSTICE PROJECT,
ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS: A POLICY REVIEW, available
at
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/national/solution/electronic-recording/
[hereinafter THE JUSTICE PROJECT] (promoting mandatory recording to guard
against false confessions).
49. Joshua M. Snavely, Note, The Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations:
Who Gets to Hold the Remote? A Separation of Powers Battle, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
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agencies, which are ordinarily “leaders in the use of innovative
investigative methods[,]” have similarly objected to implementing a
50
requirement.
Nonetheless, as described by one commentator, “[a]
movement is under way in the United States to adopt the practice
51
of recording custodial” interrogations. As laws develop around
recording requirements in Minnesota and the rest of the country,
courts will continue to face new issues concerning the scope of
their application. State v. Sanders, in which the Minnesota Supreme
Court considered whether the recording requirement applied to
custodial interrogations conducted outside Minnesota, is a case in
52
point.
III. THE SANDERS DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
In 2004, Jonathan Sanders lived with S.J. and S.J.’s daughter,
53
B.J., who was eleven years old at the time.
Sanders allegedly
sexually assaulted B.J. while Sanders was home alone with her on
54
October 29, 2004. After B.J. told her mother what happened, S.J.
called the St. Paul Police Department, and B.J. described the
55
incident to the police. S.J. suggested to the police that Sanders
56
might have fled to Chicago.
The St. Paul Police Department issued a warrant and worked
57
with the Minneapolis office of the FBI to apprehend Sanders.
The Minneapolis office then contacted the FBI agents in the
Chicago office for assistance in locating Sanders based on S.J.’s
58
belief that Sanders may have fled to Chicago.
FBI agents in
Chicago eventually apprehended Sanders at his mother’s residence
on May 24, 2005, and interrogated him at a Chicago Police

193, 196 (2010) (providing an overview of recording at both the state and federal
level).
50. Recording Federal Interviews, supra note 47, at 1303.
51. Id. at 1311.
52. 775 N.W.2d 883, 886 (Minn. 2009).
53. Id. at 885.
54. Id.
55. Id. B.J. also told her mother and the police that Sanders had initiated
sexual contact with her on two earlier occasions. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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59

Department booking station. However, the agents did not record
the session because electronic recording was not required under
60
Illinois law or FBI policy.
At trial, the district court ruled that Scales does not apply to
interrogations conducted outside Minnesota and allowed one of
61
the FBI agents to testify about the interrogation. The FBI agent
testified that Sanders waived his constitutional rights and agreed to
62
be interviewed despite refusing to sign an “Advice-of-Rights” form.
The agent further testified that, during the interview, Sanders
made several explicit statements and denied having sexual contact
63
with B.J. When Sanders testified in trial, he continued to deny
committing the offense, but also claimed that the FBI agent
64
fabricated the other statements attributed to him.
The State, however, did not focus its argument in trial on the
65
testimony provided by the FBI agent.
Instead, it focused its
argument on B.J.’s testimony and expert testimony that Sanders
could be a source of the DNA found on the towel that Sanders
66
allegedly used after sexually assaulting B.J. The jury subsequently
67
found Sanders guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
B. The Court of Appeals Decision
Sanders appealed his conviction, arguing in part that the
district court committed reversible error when it admitted the
unrecorded statements he made to the FBI agents during his
59.
60.

Id.
Id.; see FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL
HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL AGENTS § 7-8(1) (1978), available at http://foia.fbi.gov
/legal_handbook_spec_agent/legal_handbooks_spec_agent.pdf. Coincidentally,
Illinois enacted a statute mandating electronic recording of all custodial
interrogations that was effective less than three months later on August 6, 2005.
See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1 (2006).
61. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d at 886.
62. Id. at 885.
63. Id. at 886. These statements included:
(1) he did not ‘f* * * ’ B.J.; (2) he masturbated throughout the house on
a regular basis, including B.J.’s room, but not while she was present; (3)
he would not have sex with B.J., because he believed that she had a
venereal disease . . . and (4) he had never observed B.J.’s genitalia.
State v. Sanders, 743 N.W.2d 616, 618–19 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d 775 N.W.2d
883 (Minn. 2009).
64. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d at 886.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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68

interrogation. In support, he asserted that the Scales recording
requirement applied to the interrogation because “while the
Minnesota courts do not have jurisdiction over Illinois or FBI
procedure, the Scales requirement is a procedural requirement in
Minnesota and courts of this state have the power to admit or
exclude evidence obtained elsewhere if state standards are not
69
met.” Accordingly, Sanders argued that the court had the power
70
to exclude the evidence from the interrogation.
The court of appeals focused its analysis on the supreme
court’s intent behind the Scales requirement, as well as its
71
underlying policy. The court pointed out that the considerations
taken into account when determining whether Scales was
substantially violated include “whether the act was a willful
deviation from lawful conduct and whether exclusion of evidence
72
would deter future violations.” In light of these considerations,
the court reasoned that Scales “is a state procedural rule intended
73
to govern conduct occurring within the state.” Because the FBI
did not willfully deviate from lawful conduct and suppression of the
interrogation evidence would not prevent future violations, the
court of appeals ruled that the district court did not err by
74
admitting Sanders’s statement.
C. The Supreme Court Decision
1.

Majority Opinion

Unlike either of the lower courts’ approaches to Sanders, the
Minnesota Supreme Court applied a harmless-error analysis rather
75
than first addressing whether Scales even applied to the case. The
court noted that there are two different harmless-error tests

68. Sanders, 743 N.W.2d at 618. Sanders also argued that the court erred by
admitting evidence of prior sexual misconduct against B.J. and her sister. Id.
69. Id. at 620.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 n.5 (Minn. 1994)).
73. Id.
74. Id. Oddly, by deciding this issue the court in essence applied the second
step of the two-part analysis in Scales, even though it also decided that the facts
failed the scope requirement in the first step of the analysis. See cases cited supra
note 39 and accompanying text.
75. State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 886, 887 (Minn. 2009).
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depending on whether the error implicates a constitutional right.
The court acknowledged that it was unclear which harmless-error
test to use due to the fact that, in Scales, they declined to determine
whether the recording requirement is a due process right of the
77
Minnesota Constitution.
Rather than determining which test
applies to an alleged Scales violation, the court simply applied the
“more favorable constitutional harmless-error standard” in its
78
analysis.
Under this test, the State must “show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error was harmless[,]” which requires proving that
79
“the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the error.”
Ultimately, the court determined that the jury’s verdict was “surely
unattributable” to the admission of the FBI agent’s testimony
because it was not highly persuasive and the evidence of Sanders’s
80
guilt was strong.
Further, the court concluded that it
subsequently “need not, and [would] not, decide whether the Scales
recording rule applies to custodial interrogations conducted
outside of Minnesota or whether the alleged Scales violation . . . was
81
substantial.” As a result, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed
82
Sanders’s conviction.
2.

Concurring Opinion

In a concurring opinion, Justice Paul Anderson agreed with
the result reached by the majority that the district court did not err
83
However, Justice
by admitting the interrogation evidence.
Anderson wrote separately because he did not entirely agree with
84
the approach the majority used to reach this result.

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 888.
79. Id. at 887 (citing State v. Shoen, 598 N.W.2d 370, 377 (Minn. 1999); State
v. Scott, 501 N.W.2d 608, 619 (Minn. 1993)).
80. Id. (applying criteria established in State v. Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d 744,
748 (Minn. 2005) and State v. Hall, 764 N.W.2d 837, 842 (Minn. 2009)). Indeed,
as the court pointed out, the FBI agent’s testimony actually supported Sanders’s
claim that he did not commit the sexual act because it demonstrated that Sanders
“immediately and consistently denied the offense.” Id.
81. Id. at 889.
82. Id.
83. Id. (Anderson, J., concurring).
84. Id.
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Essentially, Justice Anderson agreed that the case should have
been decided using a harmless-error analysis, but only after first
85
holding that Scales applied to Sanders’s interrogation. In Justice
Anderson’s eyes, the interrogation should have been recorded, and
86
thus the FBI agent’s failure to record violated Scales. Nonetheless,
he concluded that the evidence was “neither inculpatory nor
prejudicial to Sanders[,]” so the error was harmless and Sanders’s
87
conviction was properly affirmed.
Justice Anderson largely based his belief that Scales applied to
the interrogation conducted outside Minnesota on policy
88
considerations.
Specifically, he pointed to the positive effects
Scales has had in the criminal justice system over the past fourteen
years, including protection of defendants’ rights and efficacy of law
89
enforcement. With this in mind, he agreed with the dissent that
“the rationale underlying Scales should and does apply with equal
force to interrogations conducted both within and outside
90
Minnesota.”
3.

Dissenting Opinion

Similar to Justice Anderson, Justice Page and Justice Meyer
91
In fact, they
criticized the majority’s analysis in their dissent.
plainly stated that the majority “ignore[d] both steps” of the twostep analysis used when addressing alleged violations of the Scales
92
recording requirement.
For that reason, the dissent pointedly
applied the two-step analysis to the facts of the case in their
93
separate opinion.
First, the dissent opined that Scales applied to the interrogation
94
conducted in Illinois.
As Justice Anderson stated in his
concurrence, Scales applied to the interrogation because the
underlying policy applied with equal force regardless of whether
95
the interrogation was conducted within Minnesota’s borders.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 890.
Id.
See id. at 890–91 (Page, J., dissenting).
Id. at 891.
Id.
Id.
Id. The dissent analogized this case to others in which the court
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Accordingly, the dissent concluded that the requirement was
violated when the Chicago FBI agents did not record the
96
interrogation in Chicago. Second, the dissent decided— pursuant
to the second step of the two-part analysis—that the Scales violation
97
was substantial. The dissent reached this conclusion using the
factors outlined in the Model Code, specifically holding that the
98
failure to record was willful and prejudicial.
Although the dissenting justices disagreed with the majority’s
use of a harmless-error analysis, they nonetheless conducted their
own harmless-error analysis to counter the majority’s conclusion
that the jury’s verdict was unattributable to admission of FBI
99
agent’s testimony. Unlike the majority, the dissent concluded that
the State did use the FBI agent’s testimony to undermine Sanders’s
100
The dissent opined that Sanders’s credibility was a
credibility.
central issue in the case and prevented the conclusion that the
jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the error in admitting the
101
testimony.
Ultimately, the dissent concluded that Sanders’s
conviction should have been reversed and the case remanded for a
102
new trial based on the foregoing analysis.

considered the admissibility of evidence from events that occurred outside of
Minnesota. Id. at 892 n.2 (citing State v. Reece, 625 N.W.2d 822, 825–26 (Minn.
2001); State v. Lucas, 372 N.W.2d 731, 736–37 (Minn. 1985)).
96. Id. at 892.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.3 (2), (3)
(1975)). As the dissent pointed out, the FBI agent’s failure to record the
interrogation was willful even though he was following both Illinois law and FBI
policy. Id. The dissent notes that under section 150.3(2)(a) of the Model Code,
“[a] violation shall be deemed willful regardless of the good faith of the individual
officer if it appears to be part of the practice of the law enforcement agency or was
authorized by a high authority within it.” Id.
99. Id. at 893. The dissent noted that “it is unclear which harmless-error
analysis should be applied to a Scales violation, if one should be applied at all.” Id.
Because the majority used the constitutional standard for reviewing harmless
error, the dissent followed suit. Id.
100. Id. at 895.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SANDERS DECISION
A. The Need for a Clear Precedent
The fundamental question in Sanders was clear: does the
recording requirement apply to custodial interrogations conducted
103
104
outside Minnesota? Scales provided plain instructions for future
courts to decide such an issue, which the courts have consistently
105
followed.
Nonetheless, the supreme court entirely sidestepped
106
the question and left the door open to a revisitation of the issue.
There are two reasons why the court should not have disposed
of the case without ruling on whether Scales applies to
interrogations conducted outside Minnesota. First, the inherent
structure of the Scales requirement necessitates the court’s initiative
to decide issues of first impression, such as the question posed in
107
Sanders. Second, it is practically inevitable that the court will have
to revisit the issue unless it sets a clear precedent for the lower
108
courts to follow.
1.

The Inherent Structure of the Recording Requirement

The Minnesota Supreme Court was arguably following a
principle of judicial modesty by declining to decide whether Scales
109
applies to custodial interrogations conducted outside Minnesota.
Ordinarily, most legal scholars and commentators agree that such
minimalism is an acceptable, and perhaps even an encouraged,

103. Id. at 886.
104. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (“The parameters of
the exclusionary rule . . . must be decided on a case-by-case basis.”).
105. See cases cited supra note 39.
106. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d at 889 (concluding the court need not decide
“whether the Scales recording rule applies to a custodial interrogation conducted
outside Minnesota.”). In fact, the issue already arose in the short time since
Sanders was decided in 2009. See In re Welfare of C.M.D., No. A09-825, 2010 WL
607090 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2010) (noting the presence of a potential Scales
issue with appellant’s unrecorded interrogation in Texas).
107. See infra Part IV.A.1.
108. See infra Part IV.A.2.
109. See infra note 110. In declining to address the issue, the court also
asserted that “certain deficiencies in the record complicate a discussion of whether
the alleged Scales violation in this case was substantial” and whether it applies to
out-of-state interrogations. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d at 889 n.5.
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110

approach for the judiciary.
However, the inherent structure of
the Scales recording requirement obliges the court to abandon the
generally encouraged notions of judicial modesty and squarely
address pertinent issues of first impression.
The supreme court created the Scales recording requirement
111
through its supervisory power, and contemporaneously held that
the “parameters of the exclusionary rule . . . must be decided on a
112
As a result, there is little guidance for
case-by-case basis.”
implementing the requirement until it is litigated because courts
are in exclusive control of the requirement’s development. The
flexibility of a case-by-case approach is conceivably advantageous in
113
some respects, but it does not take into account practical
problems or exigent circumstances that police may encounter
114
In fact, Minnesota’s
during the course of an interrogation.
approach has been criticized for its lack of “detailed provisions for
115
unforeseen circumstances and inevitable glitches . . . .”
Consequently, it is imperative that courts squarely address issues of
first impression involving the recording requirement to ensure its
effective implementation.
2.

The Inevitable Revisitation

Interestingly, the issue of whether Scales applies to
interrogations conducted outside Minnesota did not arise in the
higher courts prior to Sanders, but within a mere two months of the
116
Sanders decision it arose in the court of appeals.

110. See, e.g., The Honorable William H. Pryor, Jr., The Perspective of a Junior
Circuit Judge on Judicial Modesty, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1007, 1015 (2008) (“Modesty
improves judicial decisionmaking and enhances the security of the judiciary in our
constitutional structure.”).
111. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (“[I]n the exercise of
our supervisory power to insure the fair administration of justice, we hold that all
custodial interrogations . . . shall be electronically recorded . . . .”).
112. Id.
113. For instance, a case-by-case basis “allow[s] officers and prosecutors ample
opportunity to demonstrate valid reasons for not recording the interrogation.” See
THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 48, at 4.
114. See Everybody Wins, supra note 1, at 1131 (advocating for states to
implement recording through legislation to provide for more detailed provisions).
115. Id. at 1137.
116. See In re Welfare of C.M.D., No. A09-825, 2010 WL 607090 (Minn. Ct.
App. Feb. 23, 2010) (in which the defendant challenged the admissibility of his
interrogation conducted in Texas).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

15

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 6

340

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

In an unpublished case, In re Welfare of C.M.D., the defendant
was alleged to have committed criminal sexual conduct in St. Paul,
Minnesota, and was later apprehended in Texas by the Abilene
117
Police Department.
A St. Paul police officer requested the
Abilene officer to interview the defendant, but, in accordance with
Texas legal procedure, the Abilene officer only recorded the
defendant’s Miranda waiver and prepared an oral statement
118
In its opinion, the court of appeals
admitting to the offense.
specifically highlighted the fact that the Sanders court declined to
119
address whether Scales applies to out-of-state interrogations, and
120
similarly disposed of the case without resolving the issue.
One could easily contend that the timely occurrence of this
case alone is sufficient proof that unrecorded interrogations
conducted outside Minnesota will continue to be challenged as
alleged Scales violations. Yet there are two additional reasons why
the higher courts will continue to face the issue in their courtrooms
until they create a stable precedent.
121
First, policies for recording vary by jurisdiction and most
federal agencies are opposed to adopting a mandatory recording
122
policy. Without a definitive resolution of the issue, Minnesota law
enforcement agencies are left without procedural guidance when
working in joint federal-state operations, interstate operations, or
123
both.
As a result, out-of-state interrogations may be unrecorded
in such operations. Defendants will likely challenge the admission
of the interrogations in trial, and, regardless of which direction the
court rules, the losing party will undoubtedly use Scales as an outlet
to appeal.

117. Id. at *2.
118. Id. at *3. On appeal, the defendant argued that this constituted a
substantial violation of Scales because the interview was not recorded in its entirety.
Id. at *7.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *8.
121. See sources cited supra note 47.
122. See generally Recording Federal Interviews, supra note 47 (discussing federal
agencies’ opposition to recording despite the progression of recording
requirements throughout the country).
123. Both Illinois law and FBI policy prevented the FBI agents from recording
the interrogation in Sanders. See sources cited supra note 47 and 98.
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Second, in its avoidance of addressing the issue, the court
124
deviated from the well-established two-part test, and instead
125
applied a harmless-error analysis.
Yet the court also declined to
determine which harmless-error analysis should be employed for
126
As previously discussed, the majority’s
alleged Scales violations.
analysis in this case even confounded fellow justices on the
127
bench. The lower courts will likely be similarly perplexed by the
analysis, and may apply different tests when faced with an
128
unrecorded interrogation conducted in another jurisdiction.
In
turn, the confusion could lead to inconsistent precedent and
potentially conflicting results that litigants will appeal to the higher
courts.
Thus, it is seemingly inevitable that the supreme court will
have to revisit the issue. Rather than sidestepping it again, the
court should create clear precedent and squarely address whether
the recording requirement applies to out-of-state custodial
129
interrogations.
This will ensure procedural clarity for law
enforcement, consistency in the courts, and ultimately promote
130
judicial economy.
Yet the question remains: should the Scales
recording requirement apply to all custodial interrogations
regardless of whether they were conducted within Minnesota?

124. See cases cited supra note 39 and accompanying text.
125. State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Minn. 2009).
126. Id.
127. The concurring and dissenting justices in Sanders criticized the majority’s
approach for this reason. Justice Anderson pointed out that “[t]he majority
appears to assume without deciding that the Scales rule applies to out-of-state
custodial interrogations.” Id. at 889 (Anderson, J., concurring). Likewise, Justice
Page commented that “the court ignores both steps” of the two-part analysis. Id. at
891 (Page, J., dissenting).
128. In fact, this has already occurred. The In re Welfare of C.M.D. court
applied the two-part analysis announced in Scales rather than the harmless-error
analysis used in Sanders. In re Welfare of C.M.D., No. A09-825, 2010 WL 607090 at
*7–8 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2010).
129. One commentator similarly encourages agencies to “craft policies that
take into account the increasingly international, multi-jurisdictional, and multiagency nature of their cases.” Julie Renee Linkins, Satisfy the Demands of Justice:
Embrace Electronic Recordings of Custodial Investigative Interviews Through Legislation,
Agency Policy, or Court Mandate, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 141, 164 (2007).
130. The Justice Project recognized the importance of defining the scope of
the recording requirement “so that law enforcement officers know immediately
whether recording is required in a given case.” THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note
48, at 4.
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B. Formulating the Appropriate Precedent
By evaluating the scope of the recording requirement’s
131
132
authority and the underlying policy of its enactment, it is clear
that the supreme court should have held that Scales does not apply
to interrogations conducted outside Minnesota.
1.

Supervisory Power
133

As previously discussed,
the Minnesota Supreme Court
exercised its supervisory power to implement the Scales
134
exclusionary rule.
To determine whether Scales applies to
interrogations conducted outside Minnesota, it is helpful to
understand the scope of this particular authority and whether it
extends to other jurisdictions and their agencies.
Ordinarily, the scope of any legal authority is best ascertained
135
by referring to its source. However, the source of the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s supervisory power has been the subject of
136
debate. The supreme court has previously stated its “supervisory
137
Yet
power derives from [its] power to supervise the trial court.”
the court never actually cited an authority or basis for this power to
131. See infra Part IV.B.1.
132. See infra Part IV.B.2.
133. See supra Part III.C.
134. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994). Other states have also
avoided using their respective state constitutions as the foundation for a recording
requirement and instead used court authority to implement a recording
requirement. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533–34
(Mass. 2004) (implementing special jury instructions when interrogations are not
recorded); State v. Cook, 847 A.2d 530, 542–43 (N.J. 2004) (implementing court
rule for recording interrogations).
135. While examining the vague parameters of the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s supervisory power, Gary O’Connor similarly emphasized the importance
of understanding the source of the court’s power. See Gary E. O’Connor,
Rule(make)r and Judge: Minnesota Courts and the Supervisory Power, 23 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 605, 626 (1997). He stated:
In discussing or analyzing any power that a court possesses, it is
important to know not only the source of the power, but also when and
how a court will exercise that power. Without such knowledge, a danger
exists that the power will become a too-willing servant of the court’s
caprice or whim; a servant with no fixed duties, boundaries, or standards
of propriety.
Id.
136. See generally id. (discussing the possible sources and scope of supervisory
power for both the Minnesota Supreme Court and Court of Appeals).
137. Umphlett v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 533 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995) (citing State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn. 1993)).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/6

18

Lawrence: Criminal Law: Too Much of a Good Thing: Limiting the Scope of the

2010]

STATE V. SANDERS

343

138

supervise.
Some assert that the Minnesota Constitution
139
Yet, unlike
authorizes the supreme court’s supervisory power.
other states, the state constitution does not expressly grant
140
supervisory power to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Instead, the
Minnesota Constitution vests the “judicial power of the state” in the
courts, and the supreme court has “appellate jurisdiction in all
141
cases.”

138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Eric J. Magnuson & David F. Herr, 3 MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES:
CASE DISPOSITIONAL PROCEDURES OF THE SUPREME COURT app. D (2010 ed.) (“The
Minnesota Constitution, in Article VI, § 2, confers upon the supreme court . . .
supervisory jurisdiction over all courts of the state.”).
140. In other states’ constitutions, this power is commonly described as
“superintending control” and is referred to in express terms. See, e.g., ARK. CONST.
amend. 80, § 4 (“The Supreme Court shall exercise general superintending
control over all courts of the state . . . .”); COLO. CONST. art. 6, § 2(1) (“The
supreme court . . . shall have a general superintending control over all inferior
courts . . . .”); IOWA CONST. art. 5, § 4 (“The supreme court . . . shall exercise a
supervisory and administrative control over all inferior judicial tribunals
throughout the state.”); LA. CONST. art. 5, § 5(A) (“The supreme court has general
supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts.”); MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 4 (“The
supreme court shall have a general superintending control over all courts . . . .”);
MO. CONST. art. 5, § 4(1) (“The supreme court shall have general superintending
control over all courts and tribunals.”); MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(2) (“[The
supreme court] has general supervisory control over all other courts.”); N.M.
CONST. art. 6, § 3 (“The supreme court . . . shall have a superintending control
over all inferior courts . . . .”); N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1) (“[The supreme court]
may issue any remedial writs necessary to give it general supervision and control
over the proceedings of the other courts.”); OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (“The
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to a general
superintending control over all inferior courts and all Agencies, Commissions and
Boards created by law.”); PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(a) (“The Supreme Court shall
exercise general supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts and
justices of the peace . . . .”); S.D. CONST. art. V, § 12 (“The Supreme Court shall
have general superintending powers over all courts and may make rules of practice
and procedure and rules governing the administration of all courts.”); WIS. CONST.
art. 7, § 3(1) (“The supreme court shall have superintending and administrative
authority over all courts.”); WYO. CONST. art. 5, § 2 (“The supreme court . . . shall
have a general superintending control over all inferior courts . . . .”).
141. MINN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 2.
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Likewise, unlike other states, no Minnesota statute expressly
142
Instead,
vests the supreme court with supervisory power.
Minnesota law grants the supreme court the power to prescribe
and modify the rules of practice, as well as the power to “regulate
the pleadings, practice, procedure, and the forms thereof in
criminal actions in all courts of this state, by rules promulgated by it
143
from time to time.”
Despite the debatable source of the supreme court’s
144
supervisory power, there seemingly has been no uncertainty as to
whether the court possesses that power since it was first exercised in
145
In fact, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
the late 1960s.
increasingly exercised its supervisory power in recent years aside
146
from its execution in the Scales decision.
However, the
application of the court’s supervisory power in these cases has been
limited to judicial procedure of the courts, prosecutorial conduct,
147
or court rules.
Other states with express constitutional or
statutory grants of supervisory power similarly limit the scope of this
142. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 602–04 (2007) (“The supreme court shall have
the general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to prevent and
correct errors and abuses therein where no other remedy is expressly provided by
law.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3 (2005) (“The supreme judicial court shall
have general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to correct and
prevent errors and abuses therein if no other remedy is expressly provided . . . .”);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:4 (2009) (“The supreme court shall have general
superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to prevent and correct errors
and abuses . . . .”).
143. MINN. STAT. § 480.059 (2008).
144. O’Connor ultimately concluded that the supreme court’s supervisory
power must either stem from some inherent judicial power or some inherited
common-law power. O’Connor, supra note 135, at 626.
145. The supreme court first exercised its supervisory power in 1967 in State v.
Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967). In this case, the court
required counsel to be provided to an indigent defendant in any case that may
lead to incarceration in a penal institution. Id. at 396, 154 N.W.2d at 893. Since
Borst, the court of appeals has acknowledged that supervisory powers are reserved
to the supreme court. See State v. Gilmartin, 535 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (“As an intermediate appellate court, we decline to exercise supervisory
powers reserved to this state’s supreme court.”).
146. See, e.g., State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 2005) (holding that the
supreme court retains the “right to grant a new trial ‘prophylactically or in the
interests of justice’ without a further determination of prejudice”); Powell v.
Anderson, 660 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 2003) (holding that the supreme court has the
power to vacate a final decision of the court of appeals under its supervisory
power); State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359 (Minn. 1995) (holding that the supreme
court could exercise its supervisory powers to grant the defendant a new trial when
the prosecutor interfered with juror independence).
147. See cases cited supra note 146.
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148

power over inferior courts or tribunals.
Regardless of what its
actual source of authority may be, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
supervisory power is presumably limited to authority over the lower
courts and, by extension, officers of the court and law enforcement
agents within the State of Minnesota.
Thus, interrogations conducted by agents in other jurisdictions
in accordance with their respective laws are not subject to the
supervisory power exercised in Scales.
2.

Policy Considerations

Aside from the inherent limitations of the requirement as an
act of supervisory power, there are important practical policy
considerations that require limiting Scales to interrogations
conducted within Minnesota. The supreme court has relied on the
policy underlying Scales to determine whether the recording
149
requirement applied in past cases.
Policy should also guide the
court’s decision as to whether the requirement should apply to
interrogations conducted outside Minnesota for purposes of
150
uniformity.
To recapitulate, the Scales court intended to limit
factual disputes about defendants’ statements, promote accuracy,
discourage misleading and false testimony, curb abusive police
151
practices, and preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
While electronic recordation may be the most effective means
of promoting the foregoing policy, the recording requirement
should nonetheless refrain from placing undue burden on law
152
enforcement agencies that are responsible for its execution.
In

148. See sources cited supra notes 140, 142.
149. E.g., State v. Conger, 652 N.W.2d 704, 709 (Minn. 2002) (holding that
the “interests of justice” do not require recording all non-custodial
interrogations).
150. Although they each found that the recording requirement should extend
to interrogations conducted outside Minnesota, both the concurring and
dissenting justices in Sanders emphasized policy considerations in their opinions.
Justice Anderson argued that “the rationale underlying Scales should and does
apply” to interrogations conducted outside Minnesota. State v. Sanders, 775
N.W.2d 883, 890 (Minn. 2009) (Anderson, J., concurring). The dissent also
pointed out that “[the court has] never limited [its] concern for a defendant’s
rights solely to cases involving Minnesota law enforcement or events occurring
solely within [Minnesota].” Id. at 891 (Page, J., dissenting).
151. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1994); see generally supra Part
II.
152. The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously declined to apply Scales,
despite acknowledging that that it would be beneficial. See Conger, 652 N.W.2d at
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light of this interest, there are several practical policy concerns that
should be weighed with the underlying policy of Scales. First, law
enforcement agencies should only be expected to know the law
governing interrogations in their respective jurisdictions. Second,
even if they are aware of other laws, it is not always clear before the
interrogation is conducted where a suspect will be prosecuted, so
153
they would not know which law to follow.
Third, law
enforcement agencies may not have the equipment necessary to
meet the demands of Scales because not all states have recording
requirements.
The first two arguments have long been made in search and
154
seizure exclusionary rule analyses. Legal scholars in this context
have argued that applying more restrictive exclusionary rules to
other jurisdictions would “give inadequate weight to the real-world
considerations that govern police activity, particularly the not
unreasonable police expectation that their work is subject to the
155
The Sanders district court agreed with this
law of their state.”
approach when it held that the recording requirement “does not
extend, and would be unfair to be extended, to FBI agents or other
156
law enforcement officials who are not aware of its terms.”
Despite the fact that, unlike the recording requirement, the
laws of search and seizure are rooted in the Constitution and are
relatively more developed, the buttressing arguments are quite
analogous in the electronic recordation context of Scales. Both
exclusionary rules in search and seizure and Scales were established
157
with the intent to deter police misconduct.
In both contexts,
708 (declining to apply Scales to non-custodial interrogations).
153. Cf. John Bernard Corr, Criminal Procedure and the Conflict of Laws, 73 GEO.
L.J. 1217, 1229–30 (1985) (describing how, in the search and seizure context,
agencies may not know there is an interstate connection until the search is already
in progress or over, and “[i]n some cases, police may have no opportunity to learn
in advance which jurisdiction will receive the evidence they obtain.”).
154. See, e.g., Richard Tullis & Linda Ludlow, Admissibility of Evidence Seized in
Another Jurisdiction: Choice of Law and the Exclusionary Rule, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 67, 80
(1975) (arguing, among other things, that the forum should admit evidence when
the search was legal in the situs but illegal in the forum and exclusion would serve
no deterrent purpose).
155. Corr, supra note 153, at 1228.
156. State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 891 (Minn. 2009) (Page, J., dissenting).
157. Compare 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 358 (2008) (“The prime purpose of this
[the search and seizure] exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful conduct.”),
with State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (discussing the court’s
frustration with the law officials’ failure to record and thereafter creating an
exclusionary rule if they fail to record). The Model Code similarly considers “the
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police who are unaware of applicable law clearly will not be
158
Consequently, not only would
deterred from violating it.
applying Scales to out-of-state interrogations ignore the “realworld . . . expectation” of police officers to only know the laws of
159
their respective jurisdictions, but it would also diverge from the
160
central function of the requirement itself.
Further, jurisdictions without recording requirements may not
be equipped with the necessary recording equipment. Concededly,
in the current electronic era, many agencies are readily equipped
161
with some form of recording equipment.
Nevertheless, if their
equipment is unsophisticated or otherwise limited, this creates
potential for other Scales challenges at trial if the equipment
162
malfunctions or does not provide a clear recording.
In these
situations, it would create bad public policy to suppress probative
evidence simply because a police department was only equipped to
163
serve its own governing law.
With these three practical policy considerations in mind, it is
evident that excluding valuable evidence obtained in out-of-state
interrogations presents an ominous proposition for victims of
extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of this Code.” MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.3(3)(d) (1975).
158. See Mary Jane Morrison, Choice of Law for Unlawful Searches, 41 OKLA. L.
REV. 579, 615 (1988) (“When situs police act lawfully in the situs under situs law,
suppressing evidence under forum law will have no deterrent effect on situs
police, who did not know and could not reasonably be expected to know forum
law when they acted.”).
159. Corr, supra note 153, at 1228.
160. The Scales court made it clear that it believed it was necessary to create an
exclusionary rule specifically because “law enforcement officials . . . ignored [the
court’s] warnings” to record in the past. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592
(Minn. 1994).
161. See Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras as Tools of
Justice, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 771, 795–97 (2005) (discussing both
equipment currently employed by police departments across the country as well as
improvement in the recording technologies that are available).
162. In their article advocating for law enforcement agencies to record
interrogations, an FBI agent and two police officers recognized equipment
limitations as an “impediment preventing law enforcement agencies from
routinely electronically recording interrogations.” Brian Parsi Boetig et al.,
Revealing Incommunicado: Electronic Recording of Police Interrogations, FBI LAW
ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, (FBI, Wash., D.C.), December 2006, at 1, 3, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2006/dec2006/dec2006leb.htm.
[hereinafter FBI BULLETIN].
163. But see supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing jurors’
dissatisfaction with the excuse that it is not an agency’s policy to record
interrogations).
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crimes and the general public that violent criminals may be easily
acquitted simply because police followed their local laws and
164
policies.
As the renowned Justice Benjamin Cardozo lamented,
“[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has
165
To prevent the criminal from going free in this
blundered.”
context, both the limitation on the requirement’s authority as an
exercise of the court’s supervisory power and the underlying
practical policy concerns require finding that Scales does not apply
to interrogations conducted out of state.
C. Implementing an Effective Precedent
Minnesota has previously acknowledged other exigent
circumstances that excuse a failure to record and, to preserve the
fruits of interrogations, properly adopted exceptions to the
166
requirement.
The issue of interrogations conducted outside
Minnesota logically presents another appropriate occasion to adopt
an exception.
Adopting an exception for out-of-state
interrogations avoids placing an undue burden on law
167
enforcement and is largely enforced in other jurisdictions.
However, the exception should be limited to interrogations
conducted without the involvement of Minnesota law enforcement
168
agencies to address the potential for exploitation.
1.

Adopting an Exception to the Scales Requirement

Mandatory electronic recordation may be one of the most
169
effective reforms in the criminal justice system. At the same time,
commentators have asserted that recording policies are more
effective with exceptions “so as not to place an undue burden on
law enforcement and allow for the admission of voluntary
170
statements that went unrecorded for valid reasons.”
Indeed,
164. This was one of prosecuting attorney Eric Zahnd’s primary objections to
creating an exclusionary rule in favor of flexible legislation with exceptions. See
Eric G. Zahnd, Missouri’s Experience with Recorded Interrogation Legislation—Prosecutors
Lead Effort to Pass Sensible Law, 43 PROSECUTOR 36, 38 (2009).
165. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
166. See cases cited supra note 42.
167. See infra Part IV.C.1.
168. See infra Part IV.C.2.
169. See State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 889–90 (Minn. 2009) (Anderson, J.,
concurring) (discussing the positive effects Scales has had in Minnesota).
170. THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 48, at 4. The rigidity of a full-fledged
exclusionary rule without exceptions has driven some jurisdictions to reject a
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every jurisdiction with a recording requirement, including
171
Minnesota, provides constructive exceptions to the rule.
Whether Scales applies to out-of-state interrogations is an issue
172
of first impression in Minnesota, so the court could look to other
173
Fortunately, as discussed,
jurisdictions’ policies for guidance.
174
recording requirements have expanded throughout the country,
so jurisdictions now have the valuable opportunity to learn from
the efficacy of one another’s policies. For example, a coalition of
prosecutors and police in Missouri recently relied on the
experience of other states when they drafted proposed legislation
175
Significantly, the coalition used
for a recording requirement.
what it “believed to be the best parts of the statutes from other
states,” which included an exception to recording if the
176
interrogation is conducted outside the state of Missouri.
In fact, all states that have enacted statutory recording
requirements include exceptions that allow the admission of
177
statements made during out-of-state interrogations. Several states
direct more attention to the interrogating party and create an
exception for interrogations conducted by law enforcement officers
recording requirement. For example, the Mayor of the District of Columbia
vetoed proposed legislation precisely because it did not provide for exceptions.
Everybody Wins, supra note 1, at 1137 n.40. In his letter to the District of
Columbia’s City Council, the Mayor stated:
While I share the Council’s view that electronic recording of
interrogations is desirable, the sanction to exclude an unrecorded
statement, no matter what the circumstances of the non-recording may
be, goes too far and provides an unacceptable vehicle for violent and
dangerous offenders to escape criminal prosecution . . . . To impose the
rule of exclusion when an officer inadvertently fails to record a statement
punishes the victim and the public far more than the police.
Id. (citing Letter from the Honorable Anthony A. Williams, Mayor of
Washington, D.C., to the Honorable Linda W. Cropp, Chairman of the
Council of D.C. (Jan. 21, 2005) (on file with Thomas P. Sullivan)).
171. See cases cited supra note 42; see also statutes cited supra note 47.
172. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d at 886.
173. See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 190 (2006). The supreme court has previously
guided its decision by referring to other jurisdictions’ policies. See, e.g., State v.
Conger, 652 N.W.2d 704, 708–09 (Minn. 2002) (observing that no other states
extend their recording requirements to non-custodial interrogations).
174. See sources cited supra note 47 and accompanying text.
175. Zahnd, supra note 164, at 38.
176. Id. at 38. The proposed legislation was eventually passed without
amendment on August 28, 2009. Id. at 40 (codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 590.700
(Supp. 2010)).
177. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4507(1) (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-116(E) (West Supp. 2009).
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178

of another state.
Interestingly, some commentators have
combined the two approaches and recommend an exception for
out-of-state interrogations conducted “without involvement of or
179
connection to a law enforcement officer of [the forum state].”
Regardless of the other jurisdictions’ qualifying provisions, the
relevant insight to gain from each policy is the necessity to except
out-of-state interrogations.
As the number of jurisdictions with recording requirements
180
continues to rise, it is reasonable to expect that the issue of
unrecorded, out-of-state interrogations may eventually fade away.
In the meantime, to avoid placing an undue burden on law
enforcement and to adhere to the apparent multi-jurisdictional
support for an exception to the requirement, the supreme court
should create an exception to Scales for out-of-state custodial
interrogations.
2.

Averting Potential Exploitation

As was the case in implementing other exceptions to the
recording requirement, there are legitimate concerns that arise by
181
limiting Scales to interrogations within Minnesota.
One
predominating concern is that law enforcement officers could
exploit the rule by intentionally interrogating suspects outside the
state of Minnesota. Indeed, they could potentially utilize this tactic
in interstate or joint federal-state operations by simply instructing
the foreign agency to detain and interrogate the suspect in its
respective jurisdiction before transferring the suspect to Minnesota.

178. For example, North Carolina’s statute permits the admission of
statements made during an interrogation that is conducted by law enforcement
officers of another state or federal law enforcement officers. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-211(g)(4), (5) (2009); see also D.C. CODE § 5-116.01(a)(1) (LexisNexis Supp.
2007) (limiting the requirement to members of the Metropolitan Police
Department); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.073(1)(b), (c), 165.83(1)(b), 165.85(2)(c)
(West 2007 & Supp. 2009) (limiting the requirement to state officers).
179. Thomas P. Sullivan & Andrew W. Vail, The Consequences of Law Enforcement
Officials’ Failure to Record Custodial Interviews as Required By Law, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 215, app. A § 3(f) (2009) (proposing a model statute).
180. ABA RESOLUTION, supra note 4, at 5.
181. See generally 7 HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE
SERIES: CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 6.14 (3d ed. 2009) (outlining various
holdings in recording cases).
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Coincidentally, the supreme court previously addressed a
practically identical concern when deciding whether to apply Scales
182
to non-custodial interrogations in State v. Conger. Police are in a
position to similarly undermine Scales because they ultimately
183
However, while
determine when to place a suspect in custody.
the court recognized both the potential for police gaming and the
benefit of applying Scales to all interrogations, it nonetheless
184
declined to extend Scales to non-custodial interrogations.
The
court primarily based its decision on other states’ policies, the
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, and academic
185
scholars’ recommendations.
There is undoubtedly the potential for law enforcement to
abuse an exception for out-of-state interrogations similar to the
potential for abuse posed by limiting Scales to custodial
interrogations. However, just as no jurisdiction requires recording
non-custodial interrogations, no other state requires recording out186
of-state interrogations. Further, seemingly every academic article
that advocates for electronic recording also advocates for an
exception to the rule if the interrogation is conducted outside the
187
jurisdiction.
Under the supreme court’s reasoning in Conger,
Scales should not extend to interrogations outside Minnesota
despite the potential for exploitation.
Aside from the analogous conclusion reached in Conger, there
is strong evidence to support the conclusion that law enforcement
agencies would have little to gain by exploiting an out-of-state
188
interrogation exception.
In fact, some argue that law
182. 652 N.W.2d 704, 708 (Minn. 2002).
183. Conger argued that “there is a serious loophole in Scales because police
control the decision when to place a person in custody, and they can delay that
decision to avoid the recording requirement.” Id.
184. Id.
However, the court warned law enforcement agents not to
“manipulate the custody status of suspects to avoid the Scales recording
requirement.” Id. at 709.
185. Id. at 708. Specifically, the court noted that “the majority of the
academic articles advocating a recording requirement limit their endorsement to
custodial interrogations.” Id. (footnote omitted). The court also supported its
argument with the fact that “no state has extended such a mandate to
noncustodial situations.” Id. at 709.
186. See sources cited supra note 47.
187. See, e.g., Sullivan & Vail, supra note 179, at app. A.
188. Indeed, the recording requirement is effective in the first place because
“[c]ompliance imposes such minimal costs and burdens on law enforcement
agencies that they will have little to gain from noncompliance.” Stephan v. State,
711 P.2d 1156, 1163 (Alaska 1985).
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enforcement agencies are one of the greatest beneficiaries of a
189
Recording interrogations improves
recording requirement.
relations between police and the community, decreases allegations
of police brutality and misconduct, and eliminates “swearing
matches” between police and suspects over “who said what in the
190
interrogation room.” Further, both jurors and judges alike find it
increasingly difficult to believe that recording equipment was not
readily available to the interrogating officers, so recording actually
191
enhances a law enforcement officer’s credibility in trial.
Finally,
recording interrogations provides an excellent tool for training
192
new officers in proper and effective interrogation techniques.
Clearly, law enforcement agencies have more to lose than to
gain by abusing an exception for interrogations conducted outside
193
Minnesota.
However, to ensure that officers do not abuse the
exception, the supreme court should narrow the exception’s
application to custodial interrogations conducted outside
Minnesota “without the involvement of or connection to a law
194
enforcement officer of [Minnesota].” This approach is consistent
with the policy underlying the exclusionary rule in Scales, because
189. Thurlow, supra note 161, at 771.
190. Oliver, supra note 18, at 282–83.
191. Recording Federal Interviews, supra note 47, at 1316–21 (providing several
examples of cases in which the judges and juries have been dissatisfied with federal
agencies’ failure to record interrogations). For example, one judge was clearly
frustrated by the lack of recording when he told a police witness:
If you’ve got audio and videotape there, I think you ought to use it. I
don’t know why I have to sit here and sort through the credibility of what
was said in these interviews when there’s a perfect device available to
resolve that and eliminate any discussion about it.
Everybody Wins, supra note 1, at 1130 (citing Transcript of Motion to Suppress
Hearing at 72, United States v. Bland, No. 1:02-CR-93 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 13, 2002));
see also FBI BULLETIN, supra note 162, at 6 (“By recording, the officer can
demonstrate commitment to impartiality by collecting and preserving evidence in
its most unbiased and unadulterated form.”).
192. FBI BULLETIN, supra note 162, at 6.
193. The advantages of recording have caused the reform to gain wide
support of law enforcement agencies across the country. Ongoing surveys of law
enforcement personnel in jurisdictions that record reveal enthusiastic support for
the practice. Thomas P. Sullivan, The Time Has Come for Law Enforcement Recordings
of Custodial Interviews, Start to Finish, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 175, 178 (2006). In
fact, some police departments even record interrogations in jurisdictions without
statewide recording requirements. See Everybody Wins, supra note 1, at 1136
(“[M]any police and sheriff departments have voluntarily adopted the practice of
recording custodial questioning sessions.”).
194. Sullivan & Vail, supra note 179, at app. A § 3(f) (proposing a model
statute).
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the burden still falls on Minnesota officials to ensure that the outof-state agency complies with the recording requirement or they
195
risk losing any evidence obtained. At the same time, prosecutions
in joint federal-state or interstate operations will not be hampered
by suppression of valuable statements lawfully obtained before
196
Minnesota’s involvement in the case.
To illustrate, both Sanders and In re The Welfare of C.M.D.
presented opportunities for Minnesota law enforcement to request
the foreign agency to record the interrogation. In Sanders, the
Chicago FBI office contacted the St. Paul Police Department before
197
they interrogated Sanders, so the St. Paul Police could have easily
informed the FBI about Minnesota’s recording requirement.
Similarly, in In re The Welfare of C.M.D., the St. Paul officer not only
requested the Abilene officer to interview the defendant, but
actually faxed Minnesota documents to him, including of “Notice
198
of Rights” form.
If the exception was limited to interrogations
conducted without the involvement of Minnesota agencies, Scales
would have applied to both interrogations in these cases, and the
courts would have more properly proceeded with the second step
199
of the analysis determining whether the violation was substantial.
It therefore seems that one commentator accurately suggested
that “the reason[s] so few complications have occurred [with
recording requirements] are undoubtedly the liberal provisions
that excuse recordings, and the good faith efforts of law enforcement
personnel to comply with the recording mandates and to honor suspects’
200
rights.” Judging from the increase in legislation that includes an
195. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
196. Cf. Memorandum from the Office of Gen. Counsel, FBI, to Field Offices
& Headquarter Divs. (Mar. 23, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com
/packages/pdf/national/20070402_FBI_Memo.pdf (noting that restrictive state
law policies requiring recordation have precluded the FBI from using unrecorded
FBI interrogations in cases that ultimately result in state prosecution).
197. See State v. Sanders, 743 N.W.2d 616, 618 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d 775
N.W.2d 883 (Minn. 2009).
198. No. A09-825, 2010 WL 607090, *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2010).
199. Cf. cases cited supra note 39 and accompanying text. Any questions
regarding the level of law enforcement involvement required to trigger the
application of Scales are sufficiently resolved by the Model Code factors in the
“substantial” test. The note to Model Code § 150.3 explains that if a court finds
that an “agency has not taken reasonably adequate steps in good faith to assure
compliance . . . , it should give special credence to the account of the defendant.”
State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 893 (Minn. 2009) (quoting MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.3 (1975)).
200. Recording Federal Interviews, supra note 47, at 1328–29 (emphasis added).
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exception for interrogations conducted outside the jurisdiction, a
consensus is developing that such an exception is an important and
201
beneficial facet of a recording requirement.
Further, the
potential concern that officers will abuse the exception is effectively
refuted by the many benefits recording confers on law
enforcement, and the ensuing disincentive for noncompliance.
Finally, the court could preempt police gaming by narrowing the
exception to interrogations conducted outside Minnesota without
the involvement of Minnesota law enforcement.
V. CONCLUSION
Sanders showcases why Minnesota’s lack of “detailed provisions
for unforeseen circumstances and inevitable glitches” has been
202
criticized.
Unlike inherently comprehensive statutes, Scales
provides little guidance for law enforcement and courts alike, and
necessitates that courts actively develop the requirement.
Consequently, it is imperative that courts squarely address issues of
first impression regarding the recording requirement to ensure its
efficient implementation.
Accordingly, in Sanders, the Minnesota Supreme Court should
have examined whether Scales applies to interrogations conducted
outside Minnesota. Further, based on the requirement’s authority
as an act of supervisory power and practical policy considerations,
the court should have established that the recording requirement
does not apply to out-of-state interrogations. Although the
203
recording requirement has had positive effects in Minnesota, the
court should continue to recognize the necessity for exceptions to
maintain the effective administration of law enforcement, and
adopt an exception for interrogations conducted outside
Minnesota without the involvement of Minnesota law enforcement.
While Mr. Harris was accurate in his assertion that the recording
requirement was the best thing for the criminal justice system in
Minnesota, the issue in Sanders exemplifies the proposition that
there can be too much of a good thing.

201. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text.
202. Everybody Wins, supra note 1, at 1137.
203. Aside from protecting defendants’ rights, Scales has reduced the number
of law enforcement issues brought to the courts, eliminated frivolous and
unfounded objections by defendants, and provided the best evidence for
prosecution. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d at 890 (Anderson, J., concurring).
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